OWASP API Security Top 10 and API Security

The OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023) with examples and mitigations, plus a layered API security architecture with gateways, authorization, schema validation and monitoring.

OWASP API Security Top 10 (2023)

# Risk Example Mitigation
API1 Broken Object Level Authorization (BOLA) GET /orders/1002 returns another customer's order Check ownership/permission on every object access; non-guessable IDs help but are not a control
API2 Broken Authentication Weak token validation, no rate limit on login Standard IdP, strict JWT validation, MFA, lockouts
API3 Broken Object Property Level Authorization Mass assignment (isAdmin: true) or excessive data exposure Explicit DTOs; allowlist writable fields; response filtering by role
API4 Unrestricted Resource Consumption Huge page sizes, expensive queries, no limits Rate limits, quotas, max page size, timeouts, cost limits
API5 Broken Function Level Authorization Regular user calls /admin/users Role checks per endpoint; deny by default
API6 Unrestricted Access to Sensitive Business Flows Bots buying all limited sneakers Bot detection, CAPTCHA/step-up, per-flow limits
API7 Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) API fetches user-supplied URL to internal metadata service URL allowlists, block internal ranges, IMDSv2, egress controls
API8 Security Misconfiguration Verbose errors, open CORS, missing TLS Hardened configs, CORS allowlists, security headers
API9 Improper Inventory Management Old /v1 still exposed without controls; shadow APIs API catalog, gateway-only exposure, retirement process
API10 Unsafe Consumption of APIs Trusting third-party API responses blindly Validate and sanitize upstream data, timeouts, TLS

Layered API security architecture

flowchart LR
  C[Client] --> WAF[WAF + bot protection<br/>+ DDoS]
  WAF --> GW[API gateway<br/>authN, schema validation,<br/>rate limits, quotas]
  GW --> SVC[Service<br/>object & property authorization,<br/>business limits]
  SVC --> DATA[(Data)]
  GW & SVC --> SIEM[Logs → SIEM<br/>anomaly detection]
  CAT[API catalog + specs] -.governs.-> GW

Mass assignment protection in Spring

// Bad: binding the entity directly lets clients set any field
// @PutMapping("/users/{id}") User update(@RequestBody User user)

record UpdateProfileRequest(@Size(max = 80) String displayName, @Email String email) {}   // allowlisted fields only

@PutMapping("/users/me")
ProfileView update(@Valid @RequestBody UpdateProfileRequest req, @AuthenticationPrincipal Jwt jwt) {
    return profiles.update(jwt.getSubject(), req);
}

Interview questions and answers

How do you test for BOLA systematically?

Automated tests with two users: every endpoint that takes an object ID is called by user B with user A's IDs and must return 403/404. Include in CI; complement with DAST and API security testing tools.

What does an API gateway not protect you from?

Business-logic flaws, BOLA and property-level authorization, because the gateway does not know data ownership. Those must be enforced in services.